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Abstract
is article aims to the logical development of a practical and applicable analysis 
model of argumentative transparency, specically for the study of public policies.
To this end, we draw upon a “political concept of transparency” which redenes 
pragmatic logic operations in contexts of trust and cooperation between actors.
e model combines a principal-agent framework, non-linear assumptions of 
production of information, and conversational maxims of use of language.
is results in an analysis that is focused on the actors’ capacity and their 
relation. e model also nds a necessary link between active and passive 
transparency processes, where the building of trust arising from transparency is 
directly associated with the reduction of control costs.
In addition, this article intends to be an applied model, with visual tools related 
to transparent decision-making processes, protocols for marking up transparency 
in texts and, nally, an empirical analysis of transparency in the argument of 
specic public policies.  e combination of multiple frameworks and the 
deduction of a logical model presents an original work for the study of public 
policies.
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Statement of the problem and article objectives
Transparency is a vague concept. In general, this concept has not been approached scientically with 
precision, but it has been widely used in political contexts to show some kind of “commitment” to build 
trust between actors.
e rst observation to make is that social and economic studies has not been successful with theoretical 
transparency denition, with limited concepts and with gaps in applied approaches (Gupta and Mason, 
2014). From the information theory (Cover and omas, 2006) to cooperation models in the game theory 
(Schmidt, 2002), to name but a few, there are multiple and complex variations of mathematical calculations 
and social ontology related to a vague concept of transparency. Hence, such kind of transparency denitions 
have not had practical implications.
However, if transparency attempts to be a practical commitment in the political sense, it is best to deal with 
it along the same lines. e rules of abstract logic that are not processed in real time by actors (Gilles, 2010) 
will hardly have the practical sense which the notion of transparency apparently wants to have from this 
political point of view.
In fact, the objective of this article is to identify and modeling the logic behind the political commitment 
that is attempted to be established between actors. e ultimate goal is to test a denition of transparency 
that can be applied.
us, this article aims to adapt the maxims of the pragmatic use of language in a principal-agent context of 
asymmetric information. After dening a pragmatic logic of transparency, our model will be applied to the 
analysis of specic public policiesi.
eoretical framework: principal-agent and use of language
e so-called information economics (Laont and Martimort, 2002) has focused on the problem of 
asymmetric information between principal and agent.
Principal and agent enter into a contract that is based on the following idea: the agent’s capacity enables 
him to deal with the principal’s matters.
e rst thing we need to clarify is that this contract of “representation” is not a complete delegation, but 
rather it involves the principal’s commitment to monitoring the agent, so that the agent adjusts its behavior 
to the contract in case of non-compliance.
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Meanwhile, Stiglitz and Arnott (1986) dene the relation in terms of a “moral hazard” assumed by the 
principal, who never has complete information about the agent’s actions. e moral hazard means that the 
handling of closed, privileged information by the agent may bring about negative consequences for the 
principal. is is the problem that has to be dealt with.
However, it is important to take an in-depth look at the situation. In fact, the so-called asymmetric 
information which is dened in our theoretical framework is based on two (1 and 2) conditions: asymmetry 
is related to the knowledge of the true capacity of the agent (1), and always in a context of dierent 
interpretations about the limits of the contract, which is imperfect and incomplete (2). is point is 
essential to understanding this model and will be discussed further below.
us, in the context of this “moral hazard” (Stiglitz and Arnott, 1986) problem, access to information under 
conditions of transparency may be an eective means of control to ensure the agent adjusts its behavior to 
the principal-agent contractii.
But, under these circumstances, how can we guarantee the communication of transparent information from 
the agent to the principal?
is involves considering the pragmatic dimension of the use of language and, in particular, Grice’s 
maximsiii (Cole and Morgan, 1975). is framework has several advantages to resolve problems arising from 
the principal-agent asymmetric information. Specically, it will allow us to consider transparency without 
rigid models of abstract logic (Gamut, 1991) and to think about better conditions of transparency arising 
from the search of trust and political cooperation that we assume of actors.
A pragmatic logic model requires certain rules that build trust in other actors (creating possibilities of control), 
but does not depend on the logic condition of truth of the statements. us, the agent’s transparency 
consists in giving information that will allow the principal to control the agent at dierent cost levels.
Model assumptions, concept denitions, and key approaches
e combination of these two theoretical frameworks (principal–agent and the use of language, at the 
points where they intersect each other) create a powerful model of information transparency. Specically, in 
this model, we dene the following assumptions which coordinate both frameworks:
1) [Pr] and [Ag] agree a vague agenda about a vague theme.
2) [Ag] has a nite capacity [Y].
3) e [Pr] knows the [Y] of [Ag] to a limited extent.
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In this context, we dene the following concepts:
1.[Pr]= Principal in the principal-agent theory
2.[Ag]= Agent in the principal-agent theory
3.Agenda= An imperfect [Pr]-[Ag] contract, a specic framework for the communication of information 
from [Ag] to [Pr]
4.eme= Framework of general criteria of construction of information where agendas are inserted
5.[Y]= Capacity of accessing data and data processing to create information
at is to say, the rst reference that we should seek to demonstrate is that there is a specic, although 
incomplete, contract between the principal and the agent in the context of a theme. A theme is certain 
“state of the art” that reects the history, in various real contexts, of the construction of information with 
dierent levels of legitimacy regarding its accuracy and completeness. e agenda is specic to a context, 
while the theme exceeds the particular context.
en we dened the capacity of the agent that has information as an access and processing capacity 
(transforming data into information)iv.
Here it is also important to specify the overall concept of information, since information results from 
integrating dierent components in an argument. erefore, when we talk about transforming data into 
information, we actually think about integrating data in an informative argument. Argument links a statement 
(“A” or “B”) with its resources (evidence and thematic standards, in this model). In this context, we need to 
dene one more concept (at least now) to create a pragmatic logic of transparency model: evidence.
6.Evidence= Methodical construction of information based on data
Finally, to conclude this section, we dene two key approaches that are needed for the development of the 
model:
I. Selection of information statement (select an “A”) = Performed through the “theory of attention” (Cohen, 
March & Olsen, 1972, pp. 3)
II. Ordering of information statement (“A” > “B”) = Performed by delimitation of a theme
ese key approaches I and II are essential for a pragmatic logic of transparency since they entail two 
points.
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Firstly, a rupture with linear logics in the construction of information by assuming that attention 
determines selection. An “A” is stated (selected) because the evidence which allows to make a statement “A” 
was  
important point of the model because this selection may cost as much as [Y] or less than [Y] for the agent. 
with evidence).
Secondly, at a higher level, whenever there are ordering criteria, these depend on the delimitation of the 
theme’s general framework, which will depend, in turn, on the agenda and [Y]. We will elaborate on the 
application of these ideas below.
We have reformulated Grice’s maxims (Cole and Morgan, 1975) as conditions for transparency of the 
information provided by an agent to a principal (active transparency).
vi “A” if:
3. Any “B” that is more relevant to the theme than “A” (“B” > “A”) does not comply with: maxims 1 and 2 
and is adaptable to the domain.
Let us explain in detail these three maxims of transparency.
Maxim 1 and maxim 2 fall within key approach I (based on the theory of attention), whereas maxim 3 falls 
within key approach II (based on ordering).
Maxim 1 implies an obligation of the agent to provide evidence about what he states, while maxim 2 
principal already had.
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v 
For our purposes, we are interested in the comparison (ordering) to determine the pertinence to the theme, 
and relevance to this theme, of armative statement “A”.
So, how does this take place from an agent’s communication?
In fact, the agent, at this point, will focus on demonstrating that there is no “B” more relevant to the theme 
than his armative statement “A”. To achieve this, the agent only has to demonstrate that “A” is equal to “B” 
(“A” = “B”).
In other words, that “A” is part of the theme (“A” is part of the state of the art) and that is the strongest 
armative statement that he could make within the theme. is is what this maxim entails for the agent.
en, how is the construction of this comparison made by the agent?
e complete “B” is constructed by the agent from a “B`” that contains dierent criteria of construction of 
information (state of the art). From this “B`”, the agent delimits the criteria, transforming “B`” into “B”. 
is means that the agent delimits the state of the art, ordering those elements that are applicable to its 
context. e important thing is that this delimitation is made in relation to the capacity [Y] of the agent 
and to the agent understanding of the limits of the principal-agent contract. ose are the criteria of 
delimitation.
is form of construction of “B” compels us to dene the domain, which we add as an initial concept of this 
model:
7.Domain= Framework of the agent’s action, according to the agent’s capacity and limits of the principal- 
agent’s agenda
We show below in four quadrants the place occupied by the domain (Figure 1) to visualize this central 
point of the model.
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From the perspective of the agent, we have four quadrants.
Quadrant 1 involves the information available within the agent’s capacity and within the theme (“B`”), but 
outside the specic principal-agent’s agenda.
e discursive construction of the agendavii (inside a theme) involves multiple dimensions (Cobb and Elder, 
1972). For example, under the theme of "government transparency" it is common in Latin American 
countries to develop an agenda of "prevention of conicts of interest of public ocials" but not an agenda 
of "control over suppliers of the government", even though government (agent) has the capacity to access 
and process that kind of information.
Quadrant 2 represents the domain, i.e. the information within the agent’s capacity [Y] and the principal- 
agent’s agenda (“B” = “A”).
Quadrant 3 is beyond the agent's capacity and the principal-agent’s agenda.
Finally, quadrant 4 is information within the principal-agent’s agenda (established agenda: under the line, 
quadrants 2 and 4), but it is information that exceeds the (access or processing) capacity of the agent. For 
example, it is the typical formula in “Access to Public Information Laws” that do not oblige governments to 
provide information that is not processed in the way it is requested, even if it is part of an agenda between 
government (agent) and society (principal). It is a matter of form not of theme.
e important point is that by limiting the theme to the agenda, the agent will seek to demonstrate that “B” 
= “A” and that there is no “B” more relevant to the theme than “A”. e delimitation involves demonstrating 
that not all “state of the art” criteria are applicable to the particular principal-agent context, but only the 
ones that are stated by the agent, according to its capacity.
In other words, from an [Y] perspective, the agent must produce the most relevant evidence ("A" plus 
evidence) in the theme and for this it must be evidence ("A" plus evidence) according to the discursive 
agenda between principal and agent.
It is important to mention that “A” is original in the agenda (information that the principal did not have, 
maxim 2), but it is not original in the theme, since it is the result of the delimitation of such theme. An “A” 
more relevant to the theme than “B” would entail a condition of originality that exceeds the requirement of 
transparencyviii.
Now it becomes clear that if there were a “B” (that complies with maxims 1 and 2 and is adaptable to the 
domain) more relevant than “A”, we would face a problem of lack of transparency, such as the problem of 
imprecise or incomplete information.
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e control side
Now, how does this model work on the principal side?
In this context of maxims of transparency to be fullled by the agent, the principal can exercise control at 
dierent costs. Transparency, as dened in this article, is associated with certain conditions that enable the 
principal to exercise control over the agent.
Firstly, if there is evidence about the agent’s armative statement, the principal can exercise the internal 
control of the evidence (an internal criticism) by presenting some hypothesis of the “Non-A” kind. In other 
words, using some kind of blocking defeater (García, 1995) as a means of passive transparency controlix, 
which is dened as the interpellation after the agent’s active transparency.
Secondly, the principal may easily know if the agent provided him with information that the principal 
already had.
irdly and lastly, the principal may exercise external control (an external criticism) by verifying the 
theoretical and/or methodological “standards” which the agent delimited from the theme. A standard is a 
benchmark to measure or value a particular armative statement worthy of a kind (theme). We include 
below the conceptual denition of standard in this model:
8.Standards= Resources of authority that link an armative statement with a theme
In the thirdly case, it is understood that the principal performs the verication from its own “B`”, which we 
will call “B``”. In other words, the principal observes from his own idea of the state of the artx whether the 
agent delimited theoretical and/or methodological standards to the domain (but now from the principal’s 
perception of the domain limits).
In this sense, the principal could present the agent with some kind of external control hypothesis, such as: 
“B” (derived from “B``”) > “A”. In other words, the limits of “B” (as understood by the principal) are “wider” 
than the ones communicated by the agent with “A”.
For the principal, this entails that there may be a “B” more relevant to the theme than “A”. It is a “B” more 
accurate and complete, which the principal did not have, and it is a “B” that could be within the agent 
domain. is is the external control approach that the principal may propose in the form of a hypothesis 
(Figures 2 and 3).
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Figure 2 shows that the principal may propose, as a (rst) control hypothesis, that (within the agent’s 
capacity [Y]) the principal-agent agenda is wider (vertically, regarding the theme) than the one stated by 
the agent (gure reference: ///////).
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the principal may propose, as a (second) control hypothesis, that 
the agent’s capacity [Y] is greater, which entails considering a wider agenda than the one stated by the 
agent (gure reference: ///////). For the transparency analysis, it is important when a lateral expansion [Y] 
widens the discursive agenda (vertical expansion)xi.
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It is important to note (from the principals’ perspective) that the agent underestimated the domain, which 
is a lack of transparency.
e dierent interpretation about the domain between principal and agent is what determines the problem 
of lack of transparency and the possibilities to control such problem.
It is also important to note that the external control hypothesis exercised by the principal is possible 
because the agent revealed his own “B”. is allowed the comparison between a “B” of the agent and a “B” 
from the principal’s perspective.
It is also worth mentioning that the agent’s active transparency is established in the three maxims, but then 
it is necessary to use mechanisms of passive transparency so that the principal exercises a control which is 
similar to an interpellation.
In this regard, the idea of control cost refers to the principal’s eort needed to raise a blocking defeater 
(García, 1995) of the “Non-A” kind or a hypothesis of control of the “B” > “A” kind. In other words, this is 
the cost of passive transparency control for the principal.
is is essential, as it enables us to understand that this logic derives from the idea that active transparency 
cannot exist without mechanisms of passive transparency (access to passive information and their costs).
It is also interesting to note that the passive transparency creates a more dialogic relation between principal 
and agent. e agent will need to demonstrate, after the external control hypothesis proposed by the principal, 
that the principal’s “B” has no evidence, that it is information which the principal already had, or that it is 
not adaptable to the agent’s domain.
Information components in a maxims tree
Now, at this point of the model, we are able to develop the denition of the components of information. As 
we have previously mentioned, these are, in fact, the components of an informative argument: armative 
statement, evidence and thematic standards.
us, we further develop this idea of components through the design of a maxims tree before applying it to 
case studies about public policies.
We include below a chart (Figure 4) in the form of a maxims tree that integrates the maxims of transparency 
from the agent’s perspective.
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X = O means that there is no evidence of X, whereas X = 1 means that there is evidence of X.
is tree shows the logic of the model of transparency applied to the agent’s decision-making processes, 
introducing the notion of level.
As we can see, the principal-agent agenda arises from the theme. is agenda and the agent’s capacity 
(derived from the notion of capacity) determine an armative statement (“A”) of the agent. is armative 
statement “A” may have no evidence (= 0) or may have evidence (= 1). is is level 1 of transparency.
In the rst case, this is a lack of transparency (italics). In the second case, an “A” is stated because the 
evidence which allows to make an armative statement “A” was “found” within a system (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972). is selection of “A” may cost as much as [Y] or less than [Y] for the agent, this is why 
maxim 3 is essential, acting in conjunction with maxims 1 and 2.
In level 2, if there is an armative statement with evidence, this could be information that the principal 
already had (which represents a lack of transparency for us) or it could be information that the principal did 
not have (original in the agenda).
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Only if we have information with evidence that the principal did not have (compliance with maxims 1 and 
2), we can move to a depth level 3. is level 3 includes the key approach II conditions, i.e. comparison 
criteria based on ordering, rather than a selection based on attention (evaluation of the standard component).
At this level 3, it is possible that there is no evidence of an armative statement “B” that is stronger than 
“A”. In such case, an armative statement “A” remains the strongest armative statement that the agent 
could make.
On the other hand, at this level 3, we could have a “B” with evidence more relevant to the theme than “A”. 
is is not a problem if at level 4 we identify that such “B” is information that the principal already had. 
is is not a problem because the agent should provide information that the principal did not have.
In contrast, at this level 4, alarms will be triggered if this is a “B” with evidence, it is more relevant than “A”, 
and it is information that the principal did not have. However, this is still not a problem (at level 5) if it is a 
“B” which is not adaptable to the domain. In other words, it does not belong to the [Pr]-[Ag] agenda and it 
is not within [Y].
Nevertheless, there would be a lack of transparency if there is a “B” with evidence which is more relevant 
than “A”, it is information that the principal did not have and it is information that should have been 
provided because it is within the principal-agent agenda and within the agent’s access and processing 
capacities.
In fact, as we will see below, the agent never proves (due to a condition of impossibility) that every “B” = 0, 
or that every “B” = 1 is information that the principal already had, or that every “B” = 1 is not adaptable to 
the domain. Multiple “B” is a representation of everything that is not “A”; it is the universe not embraced by 
the armative statement “A” and, therefore, every possible “B” is not demonstrable. In reality, as we 
mentioned before, what happens is that the agent will seek to prove that “A” = “B”. is test of “A” = “B” of 
the agent will allow to propose one (or several) hypothesis of passive control exercised by the principal. is 
is a hypothesis in the form of a “B” (from the principal), with evidence, more relevant than “A” (from the 
agent), which is information that the principal did not have, and it is information that the agent should 
provide because, to the principal, it is part of the principal-agent’s agenda and it is within the capacities that 
the principal considers the agent has.
In other words, with this requirement, the agent has ordered (by delimitation) certain standards of the 
theme, allegedly the most relevant ones, to construct the most accurate and complete information possible. 
In this context, the principal, through his knowledge of the theme, could propose, for example, that there 
are more relevant standards which allow to construct more accurate and complete information and that this 
is information that the principal did not have.
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e solution to this interpellation of the principal to the agent, as we have seen, will depend on whether the 
principal’s proposition is adjusted or not to the agent’s domain. Or rather, it will depend on how the 
discussion between principal and agent about the domain’s limits is resolved.
Text analysis method for a public policy study
In our case of application, we will dene two subtypes of standards: regulatory and methodological 
standards.
Regulatory standards include theoretical, conceptual and even legal standards. ese standards are linked to 
the armative statement, in order to insert it in the theme’s “state of the art”.
On the other hand, methodological standards are those directly linked to the production of evidence and, 
thus, indirectly linked to the theme.
As we will see below in the case of application of public policies, within the standard requirement, we can 
establish two depth levels for each subtype.
e rst level refers to the standard’s mention (for example, quotes) and the second level refers to the 
mention’s linkage (links to regulatory documents or to a microdata repository, for example, in the case of 
regulatory standards and methodological standards, respectively). is second level refers to the linkage of a 
standard with source documents.
e reference to certain standards (and their depth level: mention and linkage) allows the principal to 
exercise control at dierent costs. For example, the linkage would allow the principal to have a better 
perception of “the origin” of the delimitation made by the agent.
Our model and its case of application will focus on textual analysis. In other words, we will analyze certain 
texts with arguments based on armative statements. We will aim to identify associations between 
armative statements and evidence and, then, the relation of armative statements and evidence with 
regulatory and/or methodological standards. is results in two levels of control: a control of the “Non-A” 
kind and a control of the “B” > “A” kind, exercised by the principal over an agent.
us, we will have dierent levels of transparency within a text, as shown in Table 1 below.
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As we have seen in the description of type, this is an important point that deserves further attention: there 
is an association between internal control and external control. Especially, in the sense that a deeper 
external control enhances the opportunities of internal control.
A special case occurs with methodological standards, since the access to methodological sources reects the 
standards of operations utilized, but it may also show how they were utilized. For example, if the principal 
has access to a microdata repository, this enables him to make an external criticism about the method 
selection, but also an internal criticism about the method utilization.
From the principal’s perspective, a method may be poorly selected or underutilized (external criticism) or 
may be improperly utilized (internal criticism).
In other words, if we had an agent’s text at a level 1 of textual transparency, the internal criticism (“Non-A”) 
may require other levels (2 and 3) to make the job easier for the principal. e issue is precisely that access 
to such levels is not granted by the agent, which increases the costs for the principal to make an internal 
criticism to the agent.
Here it is important to understand that access to standards works, mainly, for external criticism, but reduces 
the cost of the internal criticism for the principal. is usually happens in the case of methodological 
standards.
Analysis of some public policy cases
We will use recent World Bank projects (2012-2015) which are available in its open database: http://www.
worldbank.org/projects, to make a comparative analysis of their textual transparency level. We will analyze 
public policiesxii from an agent (the national agency that prepared the text) which are addressed to a principal 
(the World Bank, entity that approves and monitor the project implementation). e analysis will focus 
on eleven (11) Latin America projects (in Spanish), with special attention to the section “Country Context” 
of such projects. is section includes a series of arguments about the national context of implementation of 
such projects.
In Table 2 below, we describe our protocol DTD (Document Type Denition) for XML (eXtensible 
Markup Language). e development of a markup metalanguage protocol allows us to dene our pragmatic 
logic criteria in a format that facilitates the subsequent analysis and exchange of information.
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e application of a markup language to a text aims to identify, as unambiguously as possible, the preceding 
components (XML elements) and every possible combination of them. Initially we worked with a simple 
format, described in Table 2, but the possibilities of increasing the complexity of this type of application are 
high, for example, through XML attributes or by articulating the DTD RDF (Resource Description 
Framework) in order to create XML/RDF protocols.
is enables us to identify transparent arguments with armative statements, evidence, standards and linkages. 
And other arguments which are not as complete in terms of their level of transparency: an armative statement 
with evidence, but without standards; an armative statement with evidence and standards, but without 
linkages; or an armative statement with standards, but without evidence. is last case, clearly, does not 
comply with level 1 of transparency.
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At this point, it should be mentioned that there is a legitimization among the XML elements themselves. 
In other words, an armative statement will be considered as such if it has evidence and/or standards (at 
the markup language level). Otherwise, it will be referred to as context. erefore, the legitimization is of a 
relational kind between XML elements.
Also, in this case of application, the armative statement has a feature that is important to the context of 
public policies. is involves identifying the positive or negative connotation of the armative statement 
(Meister, 1991). In general, the negative and positive connotation is about determining, in a public policy 
framework, whether it is information related to problems (needs, demands) or, on the contrary, related to 
solutions (goals, resources). In other words, information with negative and positive connotation, respectively. 
It has been noted that this dierentiation between positive and negative armative statements is very useful 
for this type of application of the model.
It is also important to clarify that, in this particular case, the objective was to identify quantitative evidence 
only, although the denition of evidence includes the possibility of methodical production of qualitative 
evidence.
On the other hand, there are some special features identied in public policy texts of the World Bank 
which involved specic decisions in the markup exercise.
It should be noted that vague mentions of evidence were added, for example, mentions in the form of “close 
to X percent”. It is assumed that there is a specic number “close to X percent”, but the agent preferred to 
argue with vague evidence.
is imprecise addition has a limit: it does not consider armative statements such as “lower than” or 
“higher than” or “it is one of the main”, which are recurrent but do not refer to any evidence. e markup 
exercise pursues precisely the objective of ruling out non-informative arguments, in the sense given in this 
article.
Particular attention was also paid to identifying quantitative evidence, taking care not to mark the reference 
universe as dierent evidence. In this regard, careful consideration was given when identifying comparisons 
as evidence, since a comparison acts by showing the level of the unit of evidence and also acts (often) as a 
standard. Anyways, this latter perspective was not considered, and comparative evidence was specied only 
as evidence.
As regards the markup rules, it was also specied that armative statements which share evidence or 
standards should be referenced as many times as the armative statement appear.
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It is also worth mentioning the problem identied with standards, especially regulatory standards. In many 
cases, it was very dicult to identify regulatory standards, mainly because internal standards (from the 
country where the public policy is implemented) are often the object of the argument rather than a standard. 
For example, a national public agency may be a standard that marks a parameter of implementation of a 
project or may be the implementing agency (object). is clearly depends on the construction of each 
particular argument.
Finally, we found numerous repetitions (of the same component of an argument); in such cases, we decided 
to mark the most accurate and complete component to avoid counting twice the same component of an 
argument. is is dierent from nested armative statements, evidence or standards, where the encompassing 
element includes the child element, which is why the element is not counted twice in our markup.
e markup method and the corresponding source les are available in the repository of the Catholic 
University of Cordoba, Argentina: http://pa.bibdigital.uccor.edu.ar/905/. 
us, based on the analysis of the markup of texts, we identied a number of interesting ndings about the 
level of transparency in World Bank public policies for the text of each of the countries included in the 
analysis.
Results: levels of transparency in World Bank public policies
Below are graphical representations of each text by country. ese graphs provide a comparison of the same 
type of text, within the same type of document and measured by the same type of protocol. e horizontal 
axis represents dierent armative statements with some level of transparency (1 or 2 or 3), in the sense of 
the timeline of the argument that is found in the analyzed text.
e vertical axis represents the measure of the level of transparency itself (1,2,3).
On the other hand, the connotation of the information included in public policies is form-coded (at 
benchmarks), where [square] represents a positive connotation, [circle] represents a neutral connotation, 
and [triangle] represents a negative connotation. Reference is only made to connotations with some level of 
transparency.
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e preceding collection of graphs can be comparatively summarized in a ranking of transparency of texts. 
is ranking could add up the number of armative statements multiplied by their level of transparency (1, 
2 or 3).
In this case of application, linked to a particular section of argument within texts of public policies of the 
World Bank, the ranking is as follows: Dominican Republic (35), Colombia (26), Argentina (20), Mexico 
(19), Nicaragua (17), Bolivia (8), Uruguay (7), Peru (4), Ecuador (4), Costa Rica (2), Chile (0). is ranking 
reects the level of transparent arguments in the section “Country Context” prepared by country teams of 
each country to be reviewed by the World Bank. e Dominican Republic is the country that argued more 
transparently, whereas Chile argued with the lowest level of transparency (in fact, no transparency at all).
Overall, arguments uctuate between level 1 and level 2 of transparency, with very few cases of level 3. On 
the other hand, standards are generally of the methodological kind, and armative statements with 
evidence linked to a regulatory standard are scarce. Standards of the regulatory kind are generally linked to 
armative statements with no evidence and, therefore, do not comply with level 1 of transparency.
Additionally, each graph shows the reference to the information connotation (neutral, positive or negative, 
according to the form), which is of particular interest for the analysis of public policies. is enables us to 
make a comparative graph of the information connotation in each country.
e graph 2 simply reects a value for each country (positive or negative) which is obtained by grouping 
the values of transparencyxiii with a positive connotation minus the group of values of transparency with a 
negative connotation, for each public policy.
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It is interesting to note that while the Dominican Republic and Colombia lead the ranking of transparency, 
they do so for arguing with dierent connotations: Dominican Republic argues with a negative connotation 
and Colombia with a positive connotation.
Mexico occupies a high position in the ranking of transparency and a middle level (value -1, near the axis 0) 
in the graph of information connotation, which means that their armative statements with dierent levels 
of transparency are fairly balanced as regards their connotation (almost equal numbers of transparent 
armative statements with a positive connotation and transparent armative statements with a negative 
connotation).
Final conclusions
A pragmatic logic of transparency constitutes a powerful model to resolve the problem of asymmetric 
information in the principal-agent framework. Or, at least, it enables us to approach such problem from a 
dierent perspective in public policy studies. In other words, the logical derivation arising from considering 
transparency as a political concept allows us to adapt the pragmatic maxims of use of language with new 
assumptions that clarify a particular model of application within this framework. Specically, the model 
promotes thinking in terms of non-linear logics of production of information and focusing on the actors 
(their capacity) and their interpretation of the agenda which links them.
e main theoretical nding is the need to associate the building of trust with the reduction of control costs 
and, particularly, to establish a link between active and passive mechanisms of transparency.
us, the possibilities of application of the model are (naturally) created by specifying the dierent 
concepts arising from this new vision of the political notion of transparency.
is allows us, for example, to develop better decision-making processes based on transparency or to 
implement specic protocols to evaluate transparency within a text or speech in public policies.
In particular, the empirical analysis applied to the principal-agent relation in World Bank texts about public 
policies shows serious weaknesses in the creation of transparent arguments in terms of a pragmatic logic. 
ese are highly professional texts, with well-regulated contracts and capacities, but, nevertheless, they 
uctuate between basic levels of transparency.
Moreover, with a proactive spirit, the model is an opportunity to develop better applications than the ones 
created here. Future applications may cover the production and evaluation of arguments, in collaboration 
with new information technologies that will be made available for the transparency of reasoning.
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e model, in this sense, redene vocabulary traditionally associated with public policy approaches, as 
"agenda" and "theme".
It is interesting to see the access to information not only as a means of control for the principal, but also as 
a product of the agent itself to adjust its own behavior. Consider, for example, rules (access to information 
laws) that do not demand an agent to give information which is intended only for the principal’s “private 
utility”.
Maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner of information.
Agenda and capacity of the agent [Y] constitute the concept "domain"; in this model.
e classic study “A garbage can model of organizational choice” (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) 
mentioned that variations in behavior in organized anarchies are due largely to questions of who is attending 
to what. From this point of view, an organization is a collection of issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they might be aired.
e analysis of transparency is limited to arguments in the form of armative statements. us, the 
concept of argument in this paper refers to an armative statement with its resources.
Discursive agenda construction: frontier in the agenda line, space of dispute of meanings.
An “A” more relevant to the theme than “B” would be more appropriate as a condition of scientic 
originality.
Type of control (passive control) based on passive transparency processes, after active transparency of agent.
Sharing an agenda (although vague) with the agent means that the principal has the capacity of 
understanding the theme (although vague) that covers such agenda. is is important so that the principal 
can exercise passive transparency control.
is work is based on the assumption of a vague agenda because we consider a discursive agenda as 
argumentative construction. e established agenda (without discussion about its upper limit) that receives 
only a claim for an agent fraud over its operational capacity seems to be a matter more related to legality or 
eciency than to argumentative transparency. We are interested when the agent undersizes [Y] to not be 
relevant to the theme, not when it is undersized [Y] to not do what is known to be and can be done.
Public policy texts contain highly legitimized information, since they are written arguments about the 
decision-making processes of governments.
Number of armative statements multiplied by their level of transparency.
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